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RECENT DECISIONS

disabling condition of statelessness 28-he becomes an alien with only limited rights and
privileges.2 9 The decision strikes down a
statute which has operated to deprive many
Americans of their citizenship because of
the mere fact that, as naturalized citizens,
they had resided abroad. The Court has
thus determined that a classification so
based is creative of a second-class citizenship. 30 The Schneider case will also strike
down at least twenty existing naturalization
treaties, 31 and will affect the lives of some
50,000 ex-citizens who have been expatri2
ated by extended foreign residence.
It appears, moreover, that this decision
may well provide the impetus for a re-examination of the naturalization and expatriation laws of the United States. One author
predicts that unless the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 is repealed, at least
six sections will now be viewed by the courts
as discriminatory in violation of due process. 33
It would appear that two alternatives remain open to Congress in this area. On the
one hand, Congress may retain a conclusive
presumption of expatriation equally appli28 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 17, at 64; accord,

Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
29 See generally Preuss, International Law and
Deprivation of Nationality, 23 GEO. LJ. 250

(1934).
3o Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 18, at 1190.
31 1d. at 1192 (dissenting opinion).

, Time, May 29, 1964, p. 57.
33 Amundson, No More Second-Class Citizenship,

110

AMERICA

847 (1964).

Recent Decision:
Appearance by Both Parties
Held Insufficient to Validate
Mexican Divorce Decree

cable to all citizens in any statute replacing
section 352(a)(1). If this is done, the
Court, while recognizing the congressional
3 4
power to expatriate in certain instances
will continue to investigate each case individually in an attempt to ascertain violations
33
of due process.
On the other hand, Congress might replace the present nationality law with a
statute creating a rebuttable presumption
similar to that contained in the Expatriation Act of 1907.36 In view of the inherent
value of citizenship, this alternative would
seem preferable. Such a law might apply
only a rebuttable presumption of voluntary
expatriation for all citizens who perform the
act designated by statute. Thus, individual
rights would not be limited for mere convenience of administration and no man
would lose his basic right of citizenship
without first being granted an opportunity
to exhibit a real attachment to the United
States.
34 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.

144, 214 (1963).
,9 Compare Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187
(1964), with Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44
(1957). In Perez, the act of expatriation was freely
voting in a foreign political election. The Court
apparently feels that activity of this type by those
claiming American citizenship is clearly more
conducive to international friction and embarrassment than is the neutral act of simple residence
abroad. Therefore, Congress was empowered to
expatriate in Perez without violation of due process; in Schneider it was not.
36 See Roche, The Loss of American Nationality
-The Development of Statutory Expatriation, 99
U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1950).

Plaintiff husband commenced an action
for annulment on the ground that a Mexican divorce procured by his wife and her
former husband was a nullity. Having pre-

10
viously agreed to dissolve their marriage
while in New York, both parties appeared
in the Mexican proceeding, the husband
personally and the wife by attorney. In
granting the annulment and declaring the
prior divorce invalid, the New York County
Supreme Court held that since neither
spouse was domiciled in Mexico, the foreign
court was without jurisdiction. Rosenstiel
v. Rosenstiel, (Sup. Ct.), 151 N.Y.L.J.,
May 20, 1964, p. 15, col. 7.
Since the United States is composed of
fifty different sovereignties, each with its
own laws of marriage and divorce, jurisdictional problems assume untold dimensions.
In a series of decisions commencing with
Williams v. North Carolina (I),' the Supreme Court of the United States undertook
to clarify the jurisdictional prerequisites for
affording full faith and credit to the divorce
decrees of sister states. In Williams v. North
Carolina(I) the Court held that an ex parte
divorce decree is entitled to full faith and
credit when the plaintiff is a bona fide
domiciliary of the granting state and the
defendant spouse is notified by constructive
service. 2 However, the case of Williams v.
North Carolina(11) 3 advanced the doctrine
that although the recognition of such ex
parte divorces is compulsory, a sister state
is not bound by a recital of domicile in the
court records of the granting state and thus
may re-examine the jurisdictional question
4
of bona fide domicile. In Sherrer v. Sherrer,
the Court, applying the principle of res

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

SUMMER

1964

judicata, held that Williams (II) was inapplicable where the defendant appeared in
the foreign forum to contest the divorce,
since the issue had previously been litigated
in a court of competent jurisdiction. The
cumulative effect of these holdings is that
only ex parte proceedings may be collat5
erally attacked in a sister state.
Thus, it is settled that full faith and
credit must be accorded to a sister state's
decrees where both parties, one of whom is
a domiciliary, are before the court. Likewise, full faith and credit must be given to
ex parte proceedings where the plaintiff has
acquired a bona fide domicile in the forum
state, with the caveat that the jurisdictional
fact of domicile may be questioned by the
sister state. Furthermore, the decree of a
sister state is to be accorded prima facie
validity.
The full faith and credit clause, however,
pertains only to sister states, whereas the
recognition of foreign divorce decrees depends upon the principles of comity. Under
comity principles-as contrasted with full
faith and credit-courts have the power to
deny even prima facie validity to the judgments of foreign countries, regardless of the
jurisdictional basis of such foreign judgments.6 Thus, foreign decrees are far more
vulnerable and uncertain than those of sister
states. New York courts have on occasion
denied recognition to all three basic types
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(2) allows an action

for divorce to be entertained if the parties were
1 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
2 However,

under ecclesiastical law the domicile
of the defendant governed. JACOBS & GOEBEL,
CASES ON

DOMESTIC

RELATIONS

363 (4th ed.

1961).

3 Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226
(1945).
334 U.S. 343 (1948).

4

married within the state. This seems to be prohibited by the Williams 11 doctrine which expressly requires the plaintiff to be a domiciliary
of the granting state. But see David-Zieseniss v.
Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup.
Ct. 1954); compare Huneker v. Huneker, 57
N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
6 Martens v. Martens, 284 N.Y. 363, 365, 31
N.E.2d 489, 490 (1940).
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of Mexican divorces: the mail order divorce, the ex parte proceeding, and the
bilateral proceeding.
The basis of jurisdiction in a mail order
divorce is consent of the parties. Both parties, while physically in New York, enter
appearances in the Mexican court by attorneys. Though neither party acquires a
domicile in Mexico, the foreign court acquires jurisdiction since Mexican law provides for jurisdiction when both parties to
a divorce action expressly submit themselves to the court's power. 7 Though such a
divorce is valid in Mexico, the New York
Court of Appeals, in Caldwell v. Caldwell,"
refused to recognize it on the ground that
neither party was domiciled in Mexico,
domicile being the controlling jurisdictional
factor. In the course of its opinion the court
noted that "the legal profession and, indeed, the general public now recognize the
valueless character of mail order divorces." 9
New York has also denied recognition to
divorce decrees where only one party actually appears before the Mexican court.
When such ex parte decrees are challenged,
courts will determine whether or not the
foreign jurisdiction was the bona fide domi-

7 Berke, Mexican Divorces, 7 PRAC. LAW. 84
(March 1961).
8298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948).
9 Id. at 151, 81 N.E.2d at 63. Despite this admonition, attorneys have aided clients in obtaining
Mexican mail order divorces, and such attorneys
have been subjected to disciplinary action. In the
Matter of Anonymous, 274 App. Div. 89, 80
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1st Dep't 1948) (an attorney was
presumed to have had knowledge of the illegality
of a Mexican mail order decree). See also In the
Matter of Peters, 286 App. Div. 246, 142 N.Y.S.2d
158 (1st Dep't 1955) (an attorney who obtained
a New Jersey decree, knowing that a client did
not comply with New Jersey's residence requirements, was suspended for one year).

cile of the plaintiff.'0 Where strong evidence
of the plaintiff's domicile is lacking, the
decree will be declared a nullity on the
ground that it is violative of public policy."
Hence, bona fide domicile is the sine qua
non of the ex parte divorce. On the other
hand, Mexican decrees based upon bilateral
proceedings have usually been upheld. In
Leviton v. Leviton, 12 for example, both the
husband and the wife went to Mexico and
obtained a divorce decree within the span
of a single day. Despite the lack of domicile
on the part of the plaintiff, the New York
court upheld the validity of the decree,
stating that
in any collateral attack ... our court ordinarily will not question the result where

both parties have appeared and where on
the face of the decree is presented clear
evidence of jurisdiction over them by the

court which rendered the judgment."3
The court rendered this decision despite the
fact that divorce jurisdiction in Mexico may
be based upon mere residence, as opposed
to domicile. 4 It is interesting to note, however, that such residence may be acquired
simply by signing a municipal register in
some instances."
Subsequent to Leviton, appellate courts,
confronted with this issue, have continually

Williams v. North Carolina (II), supra note 3;
Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130
N.E.2d 902 (1955).
10

]1 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, supra note 10, at

376, 130 N.E.2d at 904.
"26 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct.), modified mem., 254
App. Div. 670, 4 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dep't 1938).
13 Id. at 537; see also Johnson v. Muelberger, 340
U.S. 581 (1951).
14 Berke, supra note 7.

1"Residence is "proved by certificates of the municipal register of the place" in Mexico. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, (Sup. Ct.), 151 N.Y.L.J.,
May 20, 1964, p. 15, col. 7, at p. 16, col. 2.

10
upheld bilateral Mexican decrees' 6 even
though an inquiry into the plaintiff's domicile was permissible under the doctrine of
comity. The lower courts, on the other hand,
have recently chosen to collaterally examine the jurisdictional basis of bilateral Mexican decrees and to explore the issue of
domicile. 7 In Wood v. Wood,' both parties
appeared in the Mexican proceeding, the
wife personally and her husband by attorney. Neither party had obtained a certificate
of residence' 9 and the Mexican decree contained no allegation of domicile or residence. Thus, the foreign court's jurisdiction
was based solely upon the appearance of
the parties and their consent.2 ° Justice Coleman, holding the decree invalid, emphasized that under the principle of comity
New York may examine the jurisdictional
basis of the Mexican court, even in bilateral
proceedings. He declared that the foreign
decree should be denied recognition unless
the granting court had jurisdiction over the
marital res, as we understand jurisdiction in

16 E.g., Heine v. Heine, 231 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup.
Ct. 1962), aff'd mem., 242 N.Y.S.2d 705, (App.

Div. 2d Dep't 1963), motion for leave to appeal

denied, (App. Div. 2d Dep't), 150 N.Y.L.J., Sept.
17, 1963, p. 13, col. 1; Laff v. Laff, 5 Misc. 2d
554, 160 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem.,
4 App. Div. 2d 874, 166 N.Y.S.2d 678 (2d Dep't),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 4 App. Div.

2d 959, 168 N.Y.S.2d 470 (2d Dep't 1957).
17Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, (Sup. Ct.), 151
N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1964, p. 15, col. 7; Wood v.
Wood, 41 Misc. 2d 95, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup.
Ct. 1963); Molnar v. Molnar, 131 N.Y.S.2d 120
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 948, 135 N.Y.S.2d
623 (1st Dep't 1954).
1841 Misc. 2d 95, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1963).
19 Supra note 15.
2
0 The Mexican courts

may obtain jurisdiction by
submission of the parties. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,
supra note 17, at p. 16, col. 2; see Berke, supra
note 7.
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divorce actions. Such jurisdiction can only
be obtained where the plaintiff spouse is a
bona fide domiciliary of the granting state.2 '
Factually, the principal case is distinguishable from Wood by virtue of the acquisition of a certificate of residence and an
allegation of residence in the Mexican decree. 22 Justice Greenberg, in declaring the
divorce invalid, relied heavily upon the reasoning of Justice Coleman in Wood:
'A court granting a decree of divorce must
have jurisdiction ....
Jurisdiction must be
based upon domicile. . . . Unless one of the
parties ... is domiciled in the divorcing state
... the court has no power to hear the controversy ....
It is for us to decide whether
there was domicile.' 23
In applying this reasoning, Justice Greenberg explored the question of domicile and
concluded that the mere submission of the
parties to the Mexican court's power,
though adequate to provide jurisdiction
under Mexican law, was contrary to our
concept of jurisdiction which is predicated
upon domicile.2 4 Thus, a decree, proper in
all respects on its face, would not be granted
comity where jurisdiction was based upon
mere residence, as opposed to domicile. As
additional support for invalidating the divorce, the court stated that the parties' collusive agreement to procure the Mexican
divorce was violative of Section 51 of the
New York Domestic Relations Law, which
prohibits an agreement "to alter or dissolve
a marriage" between the husband and

Wood v. Wood, supra note 17, at 100, 245
N.Y.S.2d at 807.
22 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, supra note 17, at p. 15,
21

col. 9.
23 Id. at p. 16, col. 2.
24 ibid.
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wife.

25

As a result of Rosenstiel, which extended
the doctrine of Wood to decrees that even
contain an allegation of residence, it appears that a trend is being established, at
least in the lower courts, to inquire into the
jurisdictional facts of a bilateral Mexican
decree. No longer will a mere allegation of
residence preclude inquiry.
The legal profession has been reminded
that there is a distinction between the constitutional requirement of full faith and
credit and the doctrine of comity. The
former applies only to sister states and is
mandatory, 2r while the latter permits recognition of only such foreign decrees that are
not violative of public policy.2 7 This distinc-

tion, based upon sound legal reasoning,
invites close scrutiny of the Mexican divorce. Since domicile, not residence, is the
basis of American divorce jurisdiction, a
decree based upon mere residence is con-

25 A careful review of § 51 and the cases there-

under indicates that the statute has only been
employed against written agreements. The wisdom of extending this to oral agreements is
questionable in view of the probability of fraud.
In the event that one spouse had acquired a bona
fide domicile in a foreign jurisdiction, the stayat-home spouse could allege and through prejudiced witnesses "prove" such agreements and have
the decree set aside. Therefore, to prevent fraud
it is preferrable to restrict § 51 to written agreements. Whether the appellate courts will follow
Mr. Justice Greenberg's broad use of this section
is a matter of conjecture; the precedents indicate
they will not. Viles v. Viles, 36 Misc. 2d 731,
233 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1962), afl'd, 20
App. Div. 2d 626, 245 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1st Dep't
1963); In the Matter of Estate of Nichols, 201
Misc. 922, 107 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
26 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
27 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130
N.E.2d 902 (1955); ALI FAMILY LAW 132 (Clad
ed. 1958).

trary to public policy and not entitled to
comity.

2 s

Though the apparent lower court trend
is to examine the bona fides of domicile
where a bilateral Mexican divorce has been
granted, no New York appellate court has
squarely met this issue.2

9

The question of

domicile has been skirted and the foreign
decrees usually upheld. It is submitted that
the appellate courts have failed to clearly
distinguish between comity and full faith
and credit. Despite the fact that comity allows inquiry into the question of domicile,
these courts have treated Mexican decrees
in the same manner as sister state decrees.
The appellate division, in Kantrowitz v.
Kantrowitz2 0 decided on the same day as
Rosenstiel, was presented with an opportunity to clarify the domicile doctrine. In
Kantrowitz the wife claimed that the Mexican court acquired jurisdiction to enter the
bilateral decree as a result of a fraudulently
induced power of attorney and appearance
by her. Unfortunately, the appellate court
failed to discuss the necessity of domicile
and remanded the case to the trial court,
reasoning that if fraud existed, the divorce
could be collaterally attacked and declared
void.
Although Kantrowitz did not discuss the
question of domicile, it did allow an inquiry
into the jurisdictional facts of a bilateral
Mexican divorce. Thus, if fraud existed the
foreign court would be deemed to have

28

Compare Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325

U.S. 226 (1945).

E.g., Kantrowitz v. Kantrowitz, (App. Div. 1st
Dep't), 151 N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1964, p. 14, col. 2;
Heine v. Heine, supra note 16; Laff v. Laff, supra
note 16.
30 Supra note 29.
29

10
lacked jurisdiction. In Kantrowitz the appellate division, for the first time, allowed
an examination into the power of a foreign
court to grant a divorce despite the fact that
both parties appeared and submitted themselves to its jurisdiction. Consequently,
Kantrowitz appears to follow the trend
established in Wood and continued in
R osenstiel.
The underlying reasons for the failure of
the appellate courts to question the plaintiff's domicile may be social and pragmatic
ones. There are approximately 250,00031
New Yorkers who have obtained such divorces. Many have remarried and raised
children in subsequent marriages. To declare the foreign divorces void would render
the subsequent "marriages" bigamous unions.3 2 Furthermore, the rights of the parties
under the laws of descent and distribution
33
would be affected.
31

N.Y. Journal-American, Aug. 15, 1963, p. 3,

col. 1.
-'See Williams v. North Carolina (1I), supra
note 28.
33 See N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW §§ 18, 83.

Recent Decision:
Adult Patient Compelled to Take
Blood Transfusion Contrary
to Religious Belief
The petitioner, a Jehovah's Witness, refused a blood transfusion that was necessary
to save her life since the consumption of
human blood was violative of her biblical
teachings. The hospital obtained an order
authorizing the transfusion from Judge
Wright of the United States Court of Ap-
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While the appellate courts have granted
comity to the bilateral Mexican decree, the
lower courts34 have recently tended to apply
strict legal theory by requiring bona fide
domicile as a condition to recognizing the
foreign decree. The result is a state of confusion wherein reliance cannot be placed
upon even the bilateral decree. An appellate confrontation with the question of
whether domicile is the sine qua non of
recognition would be desirable. Such a confrontation appears to be the proper means
by which the prevalent confusion in the area
could be clarified, since the problem is essentially a judicial one. An alternative
means of clarifying the necessity of domicile
as a condition to recognizing foreign decrees may be by legislative action, though
this method is unlikely in view of the judicial character of the problem. Nevertheless,
because of the many social interests involved, the requirement of domicile is deserving of some definitive interpretation.
4 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, supra note 17; Wood
v. Wood, supra note 17.

peals for the District of Columbia,1 after
having failed in its attempt in the district
court on the same day. When the petitioner
requested a rehearing, the Court, in a five to
four decision, ordered the petition denied
and held that the question had become moot
since the petitioner had received the transfusion and had subsequently recovered. Ap1 Application of the President and Directors of

Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1964).

